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Abstract
This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, the development of
ﬁnancial markets and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, investor
protection promotes ﬁnancial development by raising conﬁdence and reducing the
costs of external ﬁnancing. Developed ﬁnancial systems spread risks among ﬁnanciers
and ﬁrms, allocating them to the agents bearing them the best. Therefore, ﬁnancial
development plays the twofold role of encouraging agents to undertake risky enterprises
and providing them with insurance. By increasing the number of risky projects, it
raises income inequality. By extending insurance to more agents, it reduces it. As a
result, the relationship between ﬁnancial development and income inequality is hump-
shaped. Empirical evidence from a cross-section of sixty-nine countries, as well as a
panel of ﬁfty-two countries over the period 1976-2000, supports the predictions of the
model.
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11 Introduction
A recent literature on law and ﬁnance has shown that investor protection plays a signiﬁ-
cant role in promoting the development of ﬁnancial markets (see Acemoglu and Johnson,
2003, La Porta et al., 1997 and 2003, and Rajan and Zingales, 2002, among others). In
particular, measures aimed at improving transparency and enforcement of ﬁnancial con-
tracts reduce the costs of outside-ﬁnance (see, for instance, Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002)
and shift risks onto the parties that can best bear them (see Castro et al., 2004). Several
works have recognized the importance of ﬁnancial development for various macroeconomic
variables such as growth and productivity (see, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2001 for a sur-
vey). However, this growing literature has not recognized that the changes in risk-taking
b e h a v i o ro fi n v e s t o r sa n dﬁrms, associated with better shareholder protection, may also
aﬀect income inequality. The data suggest indeed that these variables are correlated. As
shown by Table 1, for a sample of sixty-eight countries observed between 1980 and 2000,
the Gini coeﬃcient of the net income distribution is on average 10% higher (at the 5%
signiﬁcance level) in countries where ﬁnancial markets are more developed.1 Controlling
for average human capital, one of the most important determinants of inequality, this dif-
ference rises to 14% (now signiﬁcant at the 1% signiﬁcance level).2 Table 1 also shows that
countries with more developed ﬁnancial markets tend to have better institutions aimed at
investor protection.3
This paper investigates the link between investor protection, ﬁnancial development
and income inequality, both theoretically and empirically. It proposes a simple model
where investor protection promotes ﬁnancial development, thereby improving risk sharing.
This induces more risk-taking in the economy and better insurance on individual earnings,
which aﬀect income inequality in opposite ways. The relationships predicted by the model
are then confronted with the data.
To formalize these ideas, I construct a general equilibrium two-period overlapping gen-
erations model. Agents are risk averse and heterogeneous in their entrepreneurial ability.
They face a choice between a safe and a risky technology, and entrepreneurial ability af-
1I refer to the ratio of stock market capitalization over credit to the private sector as an indicator of
ﬁnancial development. This ratio measures the weight of equity-ﬁnance on overall borrowings, and is well
suited to capture the risk sharing function of ﬁnancial development. It is frequently used for this purpose
in the literature (see Rajan and Zingales, 2002).
2GiniHC in Table 1 is Gini− ˆ βHC,w h e r eˆ β is the OLS estimate from the regression: Ginii = α+
βHCi+  i. HC is human capital, proxied by the share of the population aged above 25 with some
secondary education (from Barro and Lee, 2001). The results do not change if I also control for the
Kuznets’ hypothesis by including real per capita GDP and its square, and for geography by including
dummy variables. These results are available upon request.
3The index of investor protection is taken from La Porta et al. (2003) and accounts for measures aimed
at transparency (accounting and disclosure requirements) and the enforcement of private contracts.
2Table 1
Inequality, ﬁnancial development and institutions - mean comparisons























Note. A country is labeled High Smcap if its ratio of stock market capitalization over credit to
the private sector is above cross-sectional average. The resutls are robust to the adoption of
the median as a threshold. Gini coeﬃcients refer to the distribution of net per capita income,
GiniHC are controlled for human capital. Means and diﬀerences are reported for each variable,
with standard errors in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ and ∗∗ indicate that the diﬀerence is positive at the
1 and 5 per cent signiﬁcance level. (a) the sample is reduced to 18 and 24 countries with Low
and High Smcap, respectively. Sample period is 1980-2000.
fects the probability of success in the risky project. I assume that ﬁnancial markets are
subject to imperfections arising from the non-observability of output to ﬁnanciers and
that measures of investor protection can be adopted to amend these frictions. In par-
ticular, by promoting transparency, investor protection makes misreporting output costly
for entrepreneurs.4 For instance, this cost can be thought of as the extra-compensation
the advisory ﬁrm charges to certify a falsiﬁed book. Better guarantees generate more
conﬁdence among investors, thereby making them more willing to bear risk and insure the
entrepreneurs. In turn, investors can spread the individual risk by holding diversiﬁed port-
folios of risky activities. As a result, ﬁnancial systems with stronger investor protection
allow higher degrees of risk sharing. Finally, I rule out wealth heterogeneity, so that all
inequality is due to idiosyncratic factors (ability), ﬁnancial market conditions and income
risk. Under these assumptions, better investor protection promotes ﬁnancial development
and aﬀects income inequality in three ways. (i) It improves risk sharing, thereby reducing
income volatility for a given size of the risky sector; (ii) it raises the share of the population
exposed to earning risk; and (iii) it increases the reward to ability. (i) tends to reduce
inequality, while it is increased by (ii) and (iii).
The main result of the paper is that income inequality is a hump-shaped function of
investor protection and ﬁnancial development. Any improvement upon a low level investor
protection increases risk taking more than risk sharing, thereby driving inequality up.
However, when investor protection is suﬃciently high, any further improvement is more
4Also in Aghion et al. (2005), Castro et al. (2004) and Lacker and Weinberg (1989) does investor
protection take the form of a hiding cost. In this paper, like in the two latter, the cost is proportional to
the hidden amount, while in the ﬁrst, it equals a fraction of the initial investment.
3eﬀective on risk sharing than risk taking, hence reduces income inequality.
To make the predictions of the model more easily testable, I assume that there are
only two ﬁnancial instruments, which I label equity and debt. Equity makes risk shar-
ing between investors and entrepreneurs possible, depending on the degree of investor
protection, while debt does not.5 In this way, ﬁnancial development is captured by the
thickness of the equity market, which is also a common empirical measure of ﬁnancial
development (see Rajan and Zingales, 2002, among others). Then, the testable predic-
tions of the model will be that (1) stock market size grows with investor protection, (2)
there is a hump-shaped relationship between income inequality and the thickness of the
equity market, and (3) investor protection aﬀects inequality only through stock market
development. I provide empirical evidence from a cross-section of sixty-nine countries and
a panel of ﬁfty-two countries over the period 1976-2000 in support of these results.
The contribution of this paper is related to three main strands of literature. Acemoglu
and Johnson (2003), as well as La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 1999, 2003), show that
institutions aimed at contracting protection (such as those measured by investor_pr in
Table 1) promote the development of stock markets, but have controversial eﬀects on
economic performance. None of these studies has considered income inequality.
Many papers (Beck and Levine, 2002, Levine, 2002, Levine and Zervos, 1998, Rajan
and Zingales, 1998 among others) provide empirical evidence on the link between ﬁnancial
development and macroeconomic variables, such as growth, investments and productivity,
but none of them has addressed distributional issues.6
Theoretical contributions by Aghion and Bolton (1997), Banerjee and Newman (1993),
Galor and Zeira (1993), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), and Piketty (1997), among
others, have proposed explanations for the relationship between ﬁnancial development,
inequality and growth. In most of these models, income inequality originates from het-
erogeneity in the initial wealth distribution, paired with credit market frictions. As the
poorest are subject to credit constraints, they are prevented from making eﬃcient invest-
ments in the most productive activities.7 Over time, capital accumulation determines the
dynamics of wealth and income. I depart from this approach by focusing on a diﬀerent
source of ex-ante heterogeneity, namely entrepreneurial ability, and by describing a new
5T h i sl a b e l i n gi sb a s e do nt h ec o m m o nd i s t i n c t i o nb e t w e e ns t a n d a r de q u i t ya n dd e b tc o n t r a c t s .H o w -
ever, as the ﬁnancial structure becomes more developed, a variety of sophisticated debt contracts are
oﬀered to also achieve better risk sharing. These instruments, like venture capital, for instance, can be
assimilated to equity in the model.
6All these works account for the inﬂuence of the legal environment on ﬁnancial structure. In particular,
ﬁnancial variables are instrumented with legal origins, which Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) and La Porta
et al. (1997, 1998, 1999, 2003) used as instruments for contracting protection.
7The credit constraint can derive from the non-observability of physical output as in Banerjee and
Newman (1992) and Galor and Zeira (1993), or eﬀort as in Aghion and Bolton (1997) and Piketty (1997).
4mechanism translating diﬀerences in ability into income inequality that is independent of
accumulation. In particular, I assume productivity to be a function of ability and that
entrepreneurs have no wealth for starting their ﬁrms. By encouraging investors to en-
sure entrepreneurs, better investor protection allows the more talented to undertake risky
projects, whose payoﬀs depend on ability. Heterogeneity in productivity, the extent of
risk sharing and the size of the risky sector ultimately determine the income distribution.
In this respect, the approach of Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1999) is closer to mine. In their
paper, income inequality is generated by managerial incentives, which depend on risk shar-
ing, not by ex-ante wealth heterogeneity. There, risk sharing evolves endogenously over
time as a consequence of information accumulation, while here it varies only as an eﬀect
of exogenous changes in investor protection.
The only empirical assessments of the relationship between ﬁnancial development and
income inequality are, to my knowledge, Clarke et al. (2003) and Beck et al. (2004).
Both ﬁnd evidence of a negative, though non robust, relationship between the degree of
ﬁnancial intermediation and income inequality. The main diﬀerence with respect to my
empirical analysis lays in the measure of ﬁnancial development. Instead of ﬁnancial depth,
I use the size of the equity market relative to total credit, which seems better suited to
account for the degree of risk sharing allowed by a ﬁnancial system.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
and its solution in partial equilibrium (a small open economy). In section 3, I study
analytically and by means of numerical solution how income inequality varies with investor
protection and ﬁnancial development. Section 4 argues that the main results hold in
general equilibrium (a closed economy). This version of the model is extensively described
in the appendix. Section 5 shows that empirical evidence from a cross-section of sixty-nine
countries and a panel of ﬁfty-two countries over the period 1976-2000 supports the main
results of the model. Section 6 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
2.1 Set up
The model economy is populated by two-period overlapping generations of risk-averse
agents. There is no population growth and the measure of each cohort is normalized to
one. For simplicity, preferences are represented by the following utility function:
Ut =l o g( ct)+β log(ct+1).
Second-period utility is discounted at the rate β ∈ (0,1).
5  πι ,rt+1 
{Safe,Risky} 
borrow   w it 
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Figure 1: Timing of the model
At any time t, each young agent in group i is born with no wealth and ability πi ∈
[0,1], drawn from distribution G(π). Each group is populated by a continuum g(π) of
individuals. In the ﬁrst period, agents work as self-employed entrepreneurs producing an
intermediate good, and allocate their income among consumption and savings, s(·).W h e n
old, they invest their savings and consume all the returns before dying. When investing,
they can choose between safe loans, yielding a return rt+1, and portfolios of risky assets.
There are no bequests.
2.1.1 Intermediate goods sector
Two production processes are available to each young agent: a safe and a risky one.
The safe technology does not employ capital, while the risky one requires a ﬁxed unit
investment. Therefore, the individual technological choice is analogous to an occupational
choice whereby some agents become “workers” and others “entrepreneurs”. In line with
empirical ﬁndings, I assume that the risky activity, if successful, has higher returns than
the safe one and that the probability of success depends on the ability of the entrepreneur.8
For simplicity, and without much loss of generality, I assume that ability only aﬀects the





B for i running Safe technology
A with prob. πi
ϕA with prob. 1 − πi
)
for i running Risky technology,
8See Schiller and Crewson (1997), and Fairly and Robb (2003) for empirical studies on the determinants
of entrepreneurial success, mainly among small ﬁrms.
9Ability can be considered as playing a twofold role. It enhances the chance of succeeding in risky
enterprises, as assumed in the model. But it may also raise productivity regardless of the riskiness of
projects. Introducing this second eﬀect into the model would not aﬀect the results.
6where B<A , ϕ ∈ (0,1) and success is i.i.d. within each group. It follows that there is no
aggregate risk and total production of group i equals g(πi)B or g(πi)[πi+( 1 − πi)ϕA],
depending on the technology, safe or risky, in use.
2.1.2 Final good sector
A homogeneous ﬁnal good Y , used for consumption and investment, is produced by com-
petitive ﬁrms using capital and intermediate goods. The intermediate goods produced





where Xt is the total amount of intermediate goods, with a unit price of χt,a n dKYt is
c a p i t a le m p l o y e di nt h eﬁnal good sector. Yt is the numeraire.
2.1.3 Financial sector
Both ﬁnal good ﬁrms and risky entrepreneurs need to borrow capital from the old to
produce. Information about technology (A, B, ϕ, α) and individual ability (πi) is public,
but outside ﬁnanciers cannot observe the outcome of risky activities, xit.T w o ﬁnancial
instruments, equity and debt, are available.
Equity is modeled as follows. Upon receiving one unit of capital, each young in group
i commits to pay, after production, dividend payouts θh
it and θl
it in case of success and
failure, respectively. Once production has occurred, unlucky entrepreneurs can only return
the promised amount θl
itxl
itχt. Successful entrepreneurs, instead, may misreport their
realization of xit and pay θl
itxl
itχt, pretending to be in the bad state. However, I assume
that measures of shareholder protection make misreporting costly. For every unit of hidden
cash ﬂow, the entrepreneur incurs a cost p ∈ [0,1]. Since both ability and technology are




















χt. Truth-telling is rational as long as































where v [wt,r t+1] is the indirect utility of a young agent with a given income wt and facing
an interest rate rt+1 when old.
Debt requires a ﬁxed repayment, Rit. In case entrepreneurs are not able (or willing) to
7pay, bankruptcy enables creditors to obtain min{Rit ,x it}.10 Due to log-utility, agents in
the risky sector can aﬀord debt ﬁnancing only as long as output in the bad state is higher
than the interest rate. This implies that debt is always repaid and its return equals that
of safe loans (Rit = rt for any i).
Financial contracts are set to maximize the agents’ expected indirect utility, Vit, subject
to the IC constraint and the outsiders’ participation constraint. As for the latter, old
agents must be indiﬀerent between the following investments: a portfolio with shares of
all group-i ﬁrms and safe loans. Risk aversion implies that debt is never optimal for
ﬁnancing risky projects. Furthermore, assuming that ﬁrms bear an inﬁnitesimal cost of
issuing equity, debt is preferred by the safe ﬁrms in the ﬁnal good sector. Thus, payoﬀs





































Aχt − p(1 − ϕ)Aχt,r t+1
i
, (IC’)
and the old’s participation constraint:
πiθh
itAχt +( 1− πi)θl
itϕAχt = rt. (PC)
Note that a pooled portfolio of i.i.d. shares of group i yields the LHS of (PC) with
certainty, so that the old face no uncertainty.11
2.1.4 Equilibrium
Firms in the ﬁnal good sector are perfectly competitive and maximize proﬁts taking prices
(rt,χ t) as given. Each young agent from group i has perfect foresight and chooses how
much to save, s(·), and the technology to use (safe or risky), to maximize her expected





10Limited liability can hardly apply in this context, since the entire capital accrues to the outside
ﬁnanciers. Entrepreneurs do not own, nor are entitled to anything before repaying their debt.






















v (wit,r t+1)=l o g [ wit − s(wit,r t+1)] + β log[(1 + rt+1)s(wit,r t+1)]
s(wit,r t+1)=a r g m a x
sit
{log(wit − sit)+β log[(1 + rt+1)sit]}.










ϕAχt in the good and bad state respectively. In other words,
young entrepreneurs choose technology, given their individual ability πi,f a c t o rp r i c e srt
and χt, and the dividend payouts {θl
it,θ h
it} which solve (P1).
To state the mechanism of the model in the clearest way, I ﬁrst assume this to be a
small open economy.12 Both capital and intermediate goods are internationally traded,
so that rt and χt are exogenously given from the world markets, while Y is non traded.13
Assuming that prices are constant, the economy is always in a steady-state and I can
drop all the time indexes. For simplicity, I normalize the price of intermediate goods
to one (χ =1 ). It follows that aggregate domestic consumption is C =( 1 +r)Kd+
R 1
0 w(π)g(π)d(π), where Kd denotes aggregate domestic capital.
Deﬁnition Given the interest rate r and the intermediate good price χ =1 ,t h e
equilibrium for this small open economy is deﬁned as the set of savings, technological




i∈[0,1],s u c ht h a te a c ha g e n ti ng r o u pi solves (P1)
-(P2); and the factor employments {KY ,X } that maximize proﬁts in the ﬁnal good sector.
For simplicity, I assume that ϕA < B+ r<Aand ϕA < r. This implies that both
safe and risky intermediate projects are run in equilibrium; and when investor protection
is absent, nobody chooses the risky technology.14
2.2 Solution
2.2.1 Final good sector
Proﬁt maximization by competitive ﬁrms in the ﬁnal good sector yields the following
demand functions for capital and intermediates: KY = αY
r and X =( 1 − α)Y .M a r k e t
12Later on, I will endogenize interest rate and prices, and show that the main results continue to hold.
13This assumption is immaterial, since factor prices are equalized everywhere.
14This assumption also rules out risky debt. However, it can be shown that removing this restriction
would not have any considerable eﬀect on the results.
9clearing requires Y = C + Kd.
2.2.2 Young agents
Due to log-utility, the optimal saving function of each young agent is simply a constant
fraction (1 + β)−1 of her earnings. To solve for the optimal occupational choice (P2),a n
agent born in group i needs to know the payoﬀs from the risky technology. Therefore, I







under both perfect and imperfect investor protection. Then, I characterize the occupa-
tional choice, {Ti}i∈[0,1], given the optimal payoﬀs. Finally, I show how the equilibrium is
aﬀe c t e db yi n v e s t o rp r o t e c t i o n .
Optimal equity contract: eﬃcient markets, p =1







This means that there is no incentive for entrepreneurs to misreport, so that investors
can act as if they had perfect information about xi. Having a state-invariant income is
the ﬁrst best for risk-averse entrepreneurs. Since outside ﬁnanciers behave as if they were
risk-neutral and perfectly informed, they are willing to provide insiders with full insurance,
given that the expected return equals the safe rate. Analytically, the ﬁrst-order conditions









































ϕA (i.e., earnings of entrepreneurs are state invariant: wh
i = wl
i).
Optimal equity contract: general case, 0 <p<1
If investor protection is not perfect, state invariant earnings are not incentive compatible:
entrepreneurs in the good state would be tempted to misreport xi and enjoy the higher





A− p(1 − ϕ)A. Investors are aware of this and hence
account for it when determining the dividend payouts. In other words, both (IC0) and



















ϕA +( 1− p)(1− ϕ)A.
The wedge between state-contingent earnings, i.e. the price for the temptation to misre-
10port, is decreasing in investor protection. If the cost of hiding proﬁts is high, temptation to
misreport is low, as is its price in terms of distance from the ﬁrst best. The ratio between
payoﬀs and ability is lower than in the eﬃcient case, and increasing in p. This means
that, by discouraging misbehavior, investor protection also fosters meritocracy. Expected
earnings for entrepreneurs are the same as under perfect investor protection, but expected
utility is lower, due to risk aversion. Notice that for p =0 ,t h ep a y o ﬀs from equity-ﬁnance
are the same as those implied by a standard debt contract.
Technological choice
The solution to (P2) features a threshold ability level π∗ such that the Risky technology
is chosen by any agent with ability higher than π∗. This property is formalized in Lemma
1.
Lemma 1 There exists a unique π∗ such that ∀πi ≥ π∗,π iv[(1− θh
i )A,r]+ (1− πi)v[(1−
θl






is the solution to (P1).
Proof. See the Appendix.
2.2.3 Investor protection and the equilibrium






are functions of investor protection, also the threshold
ability π∗ varies with p, as formalized in Lemma 2
Lemma 2 The threshold ability π∗ is a decreasing, convex function of investor protection
p.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Given that the risky technology is ﬁnanced with equity, the measure of agents who
choose it represents the size of the stock market. From Lemmas 1 and 2, it follows that
stock market size is a function of investor protection, as stated by Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Stock market size, sm ≡ 1 − G(π∗), is increasing in investor protection,
and concave for high p.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 1 Stock market size as a ratio of GDP is increasing in investor protection and
concave for high p.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the eﬃcient case (p =1 ), the value of producing with the risky technology is higher
than that of running the safe project whenever [πi +( 1− πi)ϕ]A −r ≥ B. Therefore, I






a n dv e r i f yt h a ti tl i e si nt h es u p p o r to fπ under the hypotheses that A>B + r and ϕA <
B+ r.
In the general case of imperfect investor protection (p<1), the expression for the





B with probability 1 for πi <π ∗
wh
i with probability πi for πi ≥ π∗
wl
i with probability 1 − πi for πi ≥ π∗
wh
i =[ πip(1 − ϕ)+ϕ +( 1− p)(1− ϕ)]A − r (2)
wl
i =[ πip(1 − ϕ)+ϕ]A − r. (3)
Henceforth, I denote the threshold abilities associated with p =1and 0 <p<1 by π∗
p=1
and π∗
p<1, respectively. For p =1 , perfect risk sharing is achieved through equity ﬁnancing
so that entrepreneurs act as if they were risk-neutral. They choose the risky technology
as soon as their ability implies expected earnings equal to the safe ones, i.e. πi = π∗
p=1.
This means that their earnings are state invariant and exhibit no discontinuity at the
threshold ability level. When 0 <p<1,a tπi = π∗
p<1 the expected productivity of the
risky technology needs to be higher than the productivity of the safe technology, because
entrepreneurs are risk averse and cannot be fully insured through equity.
Figure 2 illustrates the optimal ability-earnings proﬁles. If there is no investor pro-
tection, nobody chooses the risky technology and hence earnings are ﬂat and equal to B.
I nt h eo p p o s i t ee x t r e m ec a s eo fp =1 , income of young agents is described by the solid
line. It is ﬂat for the less able, who run the safe project, and proportional to ability for
the more talented, risky entrepreneurs. Due to perfect risk-sharing, earnings are state
invariant. If investor protection drops to 0 <p<1 (dashed line), equity-ﬁnance becomes
more costly, thereby inducing the least able among risky entrepreneurs to shift to the safe
sector. Graphically, (1) the stock market shrinks, i.e., the ﬂa tp o r t i o no ft h ee a r n i n g sp r o -
ﬁle becomes longer. I deﬁne this as the “market size” eﬀect. (2) Proportionality between
stochastic payoﬀs and ability becomes weaker due to higher incentives to misreport, and
the wedge between state contingent earnings widens due to worse risk-sharing. I call this,
as illustrated by the ﬂa t t e rs l o p ea n dh i g h e rd i s t a n c eb e t w e e nwh
ip<1 and wl
ip<1,t h e“ r i s k
sharing” eﬀect. The extent of imperfect risk sharing is captured by the jump in expected
earnings at π∗
p<1.A t a n y πi ≥ π∗






















Figure 2: Ability-earnings proﬁles.
independent of p since, for a given interest rate, the old are indiﬀerent between stocks
a n dl o a n s .H o w e v e r ,e v e nt h o u g he x p e c t e de a r n i n g sa r ei n v a r i a n t ,w e l f a r ei sh i g h e ru n d e r
perfect investor protection because of risk aversion.
3 Evaluating income inequality
In this section, I derive the key implications of the model on the overall eﬀect of investor
protection on income inequality, through the development of the stock market. To do so,
I compute the variance of earnings,











wl (π) − E (w)
i2¾
g(π)dπ,
with E (w)=G(π∗)B+ A
R 1
π∗[π+( 1 − π)ϕ]g(π)dπ− [1− G (π∗)]r, and study how it
varies with p.15
If there is no investor protection, all agents choose the safe technology and thus, the
variance is zero. If the cost of hiding cash ﬂow becomes any higher than zero (p=ε), some
agents prefer the risky technology and raise funds through equity, thereby driving the
stock market size from zero to sm(ε). By the “market size” eﬀect, a share of the economy
15Since income of the old is 1-to-1+r linked to that of the young, I focus on the earnings of the active
population only.
13becomes subject to income risk (having state-contingent earnings), thereby raising the
variance of income (analytically, positive terms fall under the integral). Moreover, average
earnings grow higher than B,s ot h a ta l s ot h ea g e n t so nt h eﬂa tp o r t i o ni nF i g u r e2
contribute to raising the variance.
As investor protection improves, “market size” is paired with the “risk sharing” eﬀect,
which shrinks the wedge between state-contingent earnings and hence, tends to reduce the
variance. Analytically, the “risk sharing” eﬀect tends to reduce the term under integration.
T h ee x t e n to ft h e“ m a r k e ts i z e ”e ﬀect is decreasing in investor protection, due to the
concavity of sm at high p. On the other hand, risk-sharing becomes more eﬀective, the
larger is the share of equity-ﬁnanced agents. This means that, when investor protection
is weak (sm is small), the market-size eﬀect dominates because risk-sharing applies to a
small fraction of the economy. Therefore, inequality at ﬁrst increases with p (and with
sm).










π)ϕ]A− r −E (w)}2g(π)dπ > 0.A sp falls any lower than 1 (p =1 − ε), the “market size”
eﬀect drives only few agents out of the risky sector, thereby reducing income inequality
by a small amount, since the diﬀerence between B, wh (π∗) and wl (π∗) is still slight. The
“risk sharing” eﬀect, instead, applies to a large share of the population, and outweighs
the “market size” eﬀect, so that there is an increase in income inequality. Therefore,
improvements upon an already very good investor protection may in fact reduce inequality,
although never below the case of no investor protection. Lemma 3 and Proposition 2
formalize this intuition.
Lemma 3 The variance of earnings is a non-monotonic function of investor protection:
dV ar(w)
dp > 0 in a neighborhood of p =0 ,a n d
dV ar(w)
dp < 0 in a neighborhood of p =1 .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Since, from Proposition 1, sm is continuous and monotonic in p, also the relationship
between stock market size and income inequality follows a non-monotonic pattern.
Proposition 2 The relationship between earnings variance and stock market size, sm ≡
1 − G(π∗), is non-monotonic:
dV ar(w)
dsm > 0 in a neighborhood of sm(0),a n d
dV ar(w)
dsm < 0
in a neighborhood of sm(1).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 shows that income inequality, as measured by the variance of earnings,
increases with stock market size for small sm and falls with large sm.H o w e v e r ,t h i sd o e s
not give a full characterization of the relationship between inequality and stock market
























































































Figure 3: Stock market size and income inequality (Panels A-B), investor protection, stock
market size (Panel C), and income inequality (Panel D). Simulation output.
size for any p. Moreover, there are alternative measures of inequality, such as the Gini
coeﬃcient, that are more commonly used in empirical work. Since a characterization of
this indicator is awkward to derive analytically, I obtain it through numerical solution.
This exercise allows me to study the relationship between investor protection, stock market
size and income inequality on the whole domain of p and to obtain a more testable version
of the prediction in Proposition 2.16
To simulate the model, I choose parameter values consistently with the restrictions
imposed on parameters throughout the paper.17 I approximate the distribution of ability
with a Lognormal(µ,σ) and parametrize the mean and variance of the associated Normal
distribution, µ and σ, with values from the actual data. Although ability per se is diﬃcult
to measure, it is likely to be reﬂected in educational attainment. Therefore, I take the
sample mean and variance of school years from the Barro and Lee (2000) database of 138
countries in 1995. Since the support of the Lognormal distribution is unbounded from
above, it must be truncated to comply with the set-up of the model. I assume the top
0.05 per cent to have ability 1, while π is lognormally distributed across the remaining
16If the assumption that risky output in the bad state is lower than the international interest rate is
removed, some of the most able agents can ﬁnance the risky project through debt, even at p=0.T h i s
means that the upper bound for the threshold ability becomes ˜ π<1 s.t. ˜ πv(A− r)+ (1− ˜ π)v(ϕA− r)=
v(B),a n ds t o c km a r k e ts i z ei sG(˜ π)− G(π
∗). All results hold, after this relabeling.
17Notice that this numerical solution is for qualitative rather than quantitative purposes. Therefore, the
technological parameters are not calibrated to the actual data.
1599.95 per cent of the population. I parameterize µ and σ to match the US data, where the
average years of schooling are 14.258, with a variance of 26.93. I normalize the resulting
ability distribution so that it ﬁts in the interval [0,1], consistent with the model. I set α =
0.33, r =0 .06, B =1 , A =2 .33, ϕ =0 .026, implying sm(p =1 )' 0.4.
Both the market size and the risk-sharing eﬀects are expected to aﬀect the Gini co-
eﬃcients and the variance of earnings in similar ways. Panel A of Figure 3, plotting the
Gini coeﬃcient against stock market size, conﬁrms the expectations: the Gini exhibits a
non-monotonic pattern, featuring a hump with its peak at a high sm. From Corollary
1, stock market size as a ratio of GDP is monotonically increasing in investor protection,
a n di sc o n c a v ef o rh i g hp. Therefore, a pattern close to Panel A can be expected for the
relationship between sm
Y and income inequality. Panel B conﬁrms this prediction. Panel
C shows stock market size to be a function of investor protection, with the properties
predicted by Proposition 1. Finally, Lemma 3 is given graphical representation in Panel
D, which plots the relationship between investor protection and income inequality.
4C l o s e d e c o n o m y
In this section, I show brieﬂy how the economy can be closed without aﬀecting the main
results discussed so far. Details of the analysis are provided in the appendix. Assume
that capital and intermediate goods can no longer be imported or exported. It follows
that their prices will be pinned down by domestic demand and supply: rt = α Yt
KYt,a n d
χt =( 1− α) Yt









[π +( 1− π)ϕ]g(π)dπ (4)
− [1 − G(π∗
t)]rt},
where the RHS is aggregate savings. Aggregate capital is allocated between the ﬁnal good
sector and risky activities:













[π +( 1− π)ϕ]g(π)dπ.
Optimal technology adoption maintains the threshold property of Lemma 1, since
agents take prices as given and the risky payoﬀs are still increasing in ability. In any
















= v(Bχt,r t+1). (5)
Diﬀerently from the small open economy, equilibrium payoﬀs wt (πi) now depend also on
the capital used in the ﬁnal sector, KYt.
Equations (5) and (4) characterize the dynamic equilibrium. In the appendix, I report
numerical solutions for the steady state and the transition dynamics. In particular, I show
that Lemmas 2-3 and Propositions 1-2 continue to hold in the steady state. Moreover,
along the transition between steady states with diﬀerent investor protection, stock market
size converges monotonically. Income inequality may instead converge along an oscillatory
path, as a consequence of the dynamics of prices and capital.
5 Empirical evidence
The model developed through sections 2 and 3 generates three main results. (1) Stock
markets are more developed, the better is investor protection. (2) Income inequality
has a hump-shaped relationship with stock market size, both in (a) absolute terms and
(b) relative to GDP. (3) Investor protection only aﬀects income inequality through stock
market size. Here, I empirically assess all the results by applying a series of cross-section
and panel data methodologies. The section is structured as follows: I ﬁrst present the
cross-sectional and panel data techniques to be used, then the data, and ﬁnally report and
comment on all the results.
5.1 Estimation strategies
5.1.1 Cross-section
To test the predictions of the model, I estimate the following static equation:
gi(t−k,t) = α + βxi(t−k,t) + γ1smdevi(t−k,t) + γ2
¡
smdevi(t−k,t)
¢2 +  i, (6)
where gi(t−k,t) is the Gini coeﬃcient observed in country i over the period between t − k
and t, the terms in xi(t−k,t) are additional explanatory variables, and smdevi(t−k,t) is the
measure of stock market development. All variables are expressed in logaritm. To test both
versions of result (2), I use two proxies for smdev: the ratios of stock market capitalization
over GDP (smcap) and over credit to the private sector (smpr). The second variable
measures the weight of equity ﬁnance over the total external ﬁnance (broadly, equity plus
debt). It has also been used in the literature to proxy the overall degree of risk-sharing that
17c a nb ea c h i e v e dt h r o u g ht h eﬁnancial market. I select the regressors in xi(t−k,t) so as to
match the technology and skill parameters of the model with observable counterparts, and
to control for factors commonly given attention in the empirical literature on inequality.
xi(t−k,t) includes time t − k GDP and GDP squared to account for technology and the
Kuznets hypothesis. I take two measures of the initial education attainment to proxy
both the level and the dispersion of human capital. In particular, I use the share of
the population aged above 25, with some secondary education (sec25), and the Gini
coeﬃcient for the years of education in the population aged above 15 (gh_15). I control
for government expenditure and trade openness to check the robustness of the results,
and replace gi(t−k,t) with git for sensitivity analysis. Result (2) is conﬁrmed by the data if
ˆ γ1 > 0 and ˆ γ2 < 0. Notice, however, that g in the model may start to decline with smdev
at high levels of stock market development that are rarely observed. As a consequence,
the signiﬁcance of ˆ γ2 might be weak in the data.
Equation (6) only captures the main result (2) of the paper (the hump-shaped rela-
tionship between stock market development and income inequality). To account for the
intermediate link between investor protection and the size of the stock market (results (1)
and (3)), I also estimate equation (6) by Two-Stages Least Squares, u s i n gan u m b e ro f
investor protection indicators as instruments for smdevi(t−k,t):




smdevi(t−k,t) = ζ + ξipi(t−k,t) + ui.
I adopt two alternative sets of instruments, ipi(t−k,t), for stock market development fol-
lowing the analysis in La Porta et al. (LLS, 2003): (i) the indicators of investor protection
and eﬃciency of the judiciary suggested by LLS as determinants of stock market devel-
opment; (ii) the origin of the legal system which is, in turn, used by LLS to instrument
investor protection. The advantages of the second set of instruments are that these are
most certainly exogenous and available for a wider cross-section of countries. The IV esti-
mation validates result (1), if ˆ ξ>0 and the F statistics of the excluded instruments from
the ﬁrst-stage regression is high. Result (3) is supported by the data, if the Sargan test
of overidentifying restrictions has a high p-value, excluding correlation between investor
protection and the residuals ei.
5.1.2 Fixed and random eﬀects
To test if the results of the paper hold both across countries and over time, I use the panel
data methodology and estimate the following equation:
18git = α + β0xit + γ1smdevit + γ2 (smdevit)
2 + ηi + νt +  it, (7)
where git is the Gini coeﬃcient observed in country i over a ﬁve-year period t, the terms
in xit and smdevit are the same as for equation (6),a n dηt, νt and  it are unobservable
country- and time-speciﬁce ﬀects, and the error term, respectively. I estimate equation
(7) under the alternative hypotheses of a random versus ﬁxed idiosyncratic component ηi.
Fixed-eﬀects estimates capture the evolution of the relationship within each country over
time. Random eﬀects are more eﬃcient, since they exploit all the information available
across countries and over time. However, the latter may be inconsistent if country-speciﬁc
eﬀects are correlated with the residuals. Including time ﬁxed eﬀects in both regressions
allows me to account for the presence of trends, such as skill-biased technical change,
which drives inequality worldwide. I rely on the Hausman test for the choice between FE
a n dR E ,a n da nFt e s tf o rt h ei n c l u s i o no ft i m ed u m m i e s .
5.1.3 Dynamic Panel Data
As a further evaluation of result (2) in a dynamic setting, I follow the approach of the
latest studies on growth and inequality, and focus on the expression:
git = λgit−1 + ˜ β
0
xit +˜ γ1smdevit +˜ γ2 (smdevit)
2 + ηi + νt +  it. (8)
Notice that the speciﬁcation in equation (8) includes a lagged endogenous variable among
the regressors. It immediately follows that, even if  it is not correlated with git−1,t h e
estimates are not consistent with a ﬁnite time span. Moreover, consistency may be under-
mined by the endogeneity of other explanatory variables, such as income and stock market
development. A number of contributions provide theoretical support (see, for instance,
Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2003, Barro, 2000, Benabou, 1997, Forbes, 2003, and Lopez, 2003)
and empirical treatments for the simultaneity between growth and inequality. Feedbacks
with stock market size instead capture the reaction of capital supply to changes in the
income distribution. To correct for the bias created by lagged endogenous variables, and
the simultaneity of some regressors, I adopt the approach of Arellano and Bover (1995)
and Blundell and Bond (1998).18 It i m e - d i ﬀerentiate both sides of (8) to obtain
∆git = λ∆git−1 + ˜ β
0
∆xit +˜ γ1∆smdevit +˜ γ2∆(smdevit)
2 + ∆νt + ∆ it, (9)
18The system-DPD methodology dominates the diﬀerence-DPD proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991),
because it amends problems of measurement error bias and weak instruments, arising from the persistence
of the regressors (as pointed out by Bond et al., 2001).
19and estimate the system of equations (8) and (9). The diﬀerences in the variables that
are either endogenous or predetermined can be instrumented with their own lagged val-
ues, while lagged diﬀerences are instruments for levels. For instance, I use git−3 as an
instrument for ∆git−1 and smdevit−2 for ∆smdevit,a sw e l la s∆git−2 and ∆smdevit−1 for
git−1 and smdevit. The estimation is performed with a two-step System-GMM technique.
The moment conditions for the equation in diﬀerences are E[∆git−s ( it −  it−1)] = 0 for
s ≥ 2, and — if the explanatory variables y are predetermined — E[∆yit−s ( it −  it−1)] = 0
for s ≥ 2. For equation (8), the additional conditions are E[∆gi,t−s (ηi + εi,t)] = 0 and
E[∆yi,t−s (ηi + εi,t)] = 0 for s =1 . The validity of the instruments is guaranteed under
the hypothesis that  it exhibit zero second-order serial correlation. Coeﬃcient estimates
are consistent and eﬃcient, if both the moment conditions and the no-serial correlation
are satisﬁed. I can validate the estimated model through a Sargan test of overidentifying
restrictions, and a test of second-order serial correlation of the residuals, respectively. As
pointed out by Arellano and Bond (1991), the estimates from the ﬁrst step are more ef-
ﬁcient, while the test statistics from the second step are more robust. Therefore, I will
report coeﬃcients and statistics from the ﬁrst and second step, respectively.
5.2 Data
I use two cross-sections and two unbalanced panel datasets. The cross-section includes
observations for 69 countries for the period 1980-2000. The sample shrinks to 43 ob-
servations when I account for investor protection and eﬃciency of the judiciary in the
regressions, since these variables are only available for 49 countries, some of which do not
intersect with the wider dataset. The main panel consists of 157 non-overlapping ﬁve-year
observations, at least two for each of 52 countries, over the period 1976-2000. Since 16
countries have less than the three subsequent observations needed for the Arellano and
Bover (1995) estimation, I use the full dataset only for the static panel regressions. I
perform the dynamic panel GMM, as well as further static regressions, on a restricted
sample of 125 observations for 36 countries over the same time span.
As a measure of income inequality, I take the Gini coeﬃcients from Dollar and Kraay’s
(2002) database on inequality which relies on four sources: the UN-WIDER World Income
Inequality Database, the “high quality” sample from Deininger and Squire (1996), Chen
and Ravallion (2001), and Lundberg and Squire (2000).19
19The original sample consists of 953 observations, which reduce to 418 separated by at least ﬁve years,
on 137 countries over the period 1950-1999. Countries diﬀer with respect to the survey coverage (national
vs subnational), the welfare measure (income vs expenditure), the measure of income (net vs gross) and
the unit of observation (households vs individuals). Data from Deininger and Squire are usually adjusted
by adding 6.6 to the Gini coeﬃcients based on expenditure. Here, the adjustment was made in a slightly
20Data on stock market capitalization (smcap) as a ratio of GDP and credit to the private
sector (privo) on GDP come from the database of Beck et al. on Financial Development
and Structure, which expands the data used in Beck et al. (1999). Their ratio is smpr ≡
smcap
privo .
The series for real per capita GDP, government expenditure and trade as a share
of GDP are taken from Heston and Summers’ version 6.1 of the Penn World Tables.
Throughout the estimations, real per capita GDP is expressed as a ratio of the ﬁrst
observation for US GDP (1980 in the cross-section, 1976 in the panel).
I use two measures of human capital. The ﬁrst is the percentage of people older than 25
years who have completed or are enrolled in secondary education (sec25). Data are taken
from Barro and Lee’s (2000) database. The second measure, better suited to capture the
distribution of human capital, is the Gini coeﬃcient of school years (gh_15) constructed
by Castellò and Doménech (2002) on data from Barro and Lee (2000).
T h ei n d i c a t o r so fi n v e s t o rp r o t e c t i o na n de ﬃciency of the judiciary come from LLS(2003).
Both investor_pr and eff_jud are indexes scaling from 0 to 10 in ascending order of
protection and eﬃciency. See LLS (2003) for a detailed description.
The data on legal origins are taken from the World Development Indicators.
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Cross-sectional regressions
Table 2 reports the Ordinary Least Squares estimates for diﬀerent versions of equation (6).
Columns 1-10 suggest human capital and stock market development to be the major forces
driving income inequality over the sample of 69 countries. As predicted by the model, ˆ γ1 is
positive and signiﬁcant for both stock market capitalization and its ratio to private credit,
while ˆ γ2 is negative, though only signiﬁcant for smpr. Notice that, according to these
estimates, stock market development should start reducing inequality after reaching levels
so high that ﬁve countries at most would be on the declining part of the Gini(smcap)
schedule, and nine in the case of Gini(smpr). Thus, it seems that only very few countries
have reached the point where the relationship between stock market size and inequality
becomes negative. This may explain the low statistical signiﬁcance for ˆ γ2. Moreover, the
model predicts that inequality should never completely revert, even when the stock market
achieves its maximum development; hence, it is reasonable to expect the linear term to
be generally more relevant, as is the case in Table 2.
The signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcients on sec25 through columns 1-4 and 9-10, in line
more complicated way to account for the variety of sources; see Dollar and Kraay (2002) for details.
21with most empirical evidence, mean that inequality tends to be lower, the larger is the
share of the population with high education. The positive and signiﬁcant estimates for
gh_15 in columns 5-8 show that the dispersion of human capital boosts income inequality.
However, the coeﬃcients for sec25 and gh_15 jointly estimated (Columns 9-10) suggest
that the former is more eﬀective at reducing inequality than the latter is at raising it.
Given that sec25 dominates gh_15, I will henceforth report the results obtained with
sec25 only. Finally, for the Kuznets hypothesis to hold, the estimated coeﬃcients of GDP
and (GDP)
2 should be positive and negative, respectively. The results in Table 2 do not
allow me to validate this hypothesis, due to the lack of signiﬁcance of both coeﬃcients.
To get a quantitative ﬂavor of the implications of columns 2 and 4, take pairs of coun-
tries with similar human capital (the other main determinant of inequality) but diﬀerent
stock market development, and compare the actual Gini diﬀerentials with their predicted
values. Ecuador and Bolivia, for instance, had roughly the same school attainment (23.6
and 23 per cent of the population aged above 25 with secondary education), while stock
m a r k e tc a p i t a l i z a t i o no v e rG D Pw a s2 . 5t i m e sl a r g e ri nE c u a d o r . C o l u m n2w o u l dp r e -
dict a lower Gini coeﬃcient in Bolivia, with a three per cent diﬀerence: very close to the
actual 3.1 per cent. Consider also Austria, which had the same level of secondary school
attainment as Switzerland (65.1 vs 65.3), but a much less developed stock market (smpr
was seven times smaller). Its predicted Gini (from the estimates in column 4) is lower
than the Swiss by 19.1 vs the actual 19.7 per cent.
The results in Table 2 support the main prediction of the model on the relationship
between stock market development and income inequality, but cannot provide evidence on
the mechanism generating it, starting from investor protection. To ascertain that investor
protection does not aﬀect income inequality unless through stock market development, I
ﬁrst regress the Gini coeﬃcient on the control variables in x a n dL L S ’ si n d i c a t o ro fi n v e s t o r
protection, and then add smdev.T a b l e3s h o w st h a tinvestor_pr indeed has a positive
and signiﬁcant eﬀect on income inequality. However, the coeﬃcients in columns 2 and
3 suggest that this eﬀect is absorbed by stock market development, once controlled for.
Moreover, columns 3 and 5 support the hypothesis that investor protection has no eﬀect
on inequality, unless paired by a thicker stock market. These results suggest that investor
protection only aﬀects income inequality through the development of equity markets.
The instrumental variables estimates reported in Tables 4 and 5 are meant to explic-
itly account for the intermediate step linking stock market development to the degree of
investor protection. Estimating the ﬁr s ts t e po ft h eI Vr e g r e s s i o n sa l l o w sm et op a r t i a l l y
replicate the analysis in LLS (2003) to verify the predictive power of investor protection
and eﬃciency of the judiciary on both indicators of stock market development. The coeﬃ-
22cients in columns 1 and 4 of Table 5 conﬁrm that better contractual protection boost stock
market development, relative to the size of the economy and the overall ﬁnancial depth.
Since these variables can be suspected to be endogenous, I replace them with legal origins
when estimating the ﬁrst stage for smcap and smpr. Columns 1 and 3 conﬁrm the results
in LLS (2003) that the common law (UK) legal origin strongly promoted the development
of stock markets. The results from only including the instrumented linear term of smdev
in the regression for the Gini’s (odd columns of Table 4) strongly support the prediction
γ1 > 0. P-values of the F and Sargan tests guarantee that both sets of instruments are
v a l i d .I no t h e rw o r d s ,i n v e s t o rp r o t e c t i o ni sag o o dp r e d i c t o rf o rsmdev (result 1), but only
aﬀects inequality through stock market development (result 3). Estimating the equation
with both linear and quadratic instrumented smdev,d e l i v e r saw o r s eﬁt and insigniﬁcant
coeﬃcients for almost all covariates (also sec25 loses signiﬁcance in one case). However,
the coeﬃcient estimates from the ﬁrst step suggest the existence of collinearity between
the two sets of instruments, which undermines the validity of this speciﬁcation.20
So far, I have regressed average Gini coeﬃcients on average stock market development.
To verify if the results are sensitive to the timing of observations, the estimates of Tables
2 and 4 are replicated in two alternative ways. First, I replace the average Gini with
its latest available observation and keep the regressors as in the previous estimates. The
results are reported in Table 6. As a further check, I focus on the period 1985-2000 and
regress the average Gini on the initial values of smcap and smpr.I nt h i sc a s e ,Id on o t
need to perform instrumental variables estimations. As shown by Table 6b, one third
of the observations gets lost. This can partly motivate the insigniﬁcance of γ2,s i n c ea
relevant part of the countries on the right-hand side of the hump is missing. Overall, this
evidence favors the existence of a positive γ1, and a weaker negative γ2.
Finally, the robustness of the results is tested in Table 7, which reports the estimates
of equation (7) where government expenditure and trade (as a ratio of GDP) are added as
additional covariates. There are no major changes from Tables 2 and 4, and the additional
coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
5.3.2 Panel regressions
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 8 report the coeﬃcients of equation (7) estimated with ﬁxed
and random eﬀects, respectively. Stock market development signiﬁcantly aﬀects income
20I have also estimated the equations in coulumns 1 and 3 of Table 4 after excluding from the sample the
countries with smcap and smpr higher than 100 per cent. The coeﬃcients ˆ γ1 were higher than in Table
4, suggesting that the relationship tends to revert when stock markets are big enough. These results are
available upon request.
23inequality, following a hump-shaped relation as predicted by the model. Four observations
lay on the downward sloping part of the hump: Hong Kong and Malaysia in the period
1991-2000. When I control for time ﬁxed eﬀects, the signiﬁcance of the quadratic term
in stock market capitalization is weakened, while the positive linear relationship remains
strong, as shown in columns 3 and 4. Education turns out to be negatively related to
inequality throughout all estimations, consistently with most of the empirical literature.
The Kuznets hypothesis is not validated by the results in Table 8. The results for the
stock market as a ratio of private credit in the last two columns of Table 8 conﬁrm the
existence of a positive γ1, but do not provide strong support for γ2 < 0. In conclusion, the
static panel analysis suggests that stock market development plays as important a role as
education in shaping income distribution.
The regression in column 3 of Table 8 to some extent controls for the time variation
in the relationship between changes in stock market development and income inequality
within countries and across time. However, it does not account for the existence of dy-
namic feedbacks between inequality and stock market development. To overcome these
methodological limitations, I adopt the approach of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blun-
dell and Bond (1998), and estimate various versions of system (8)-(9).
T h er e s u l t si nT a b l e9c o n ﬁr mt h ee x i s t e n c eo fas i g n i ﬁcant positive linear relationship
between the Ginis and stock market development. The quadratic term is also signiﬁcant
and exhibits the expected negative sign, in the estimates for smpr.T h ep o s i t i v eγ1 survives
the inclusion of time, as well as time-continent eﬀects.21 All estimated coeﬃcients for
dlog(Ginit−1) support the convergence hypothesis for income inequality, as in previous
empirical work by Benabou (1996), Lopez (2003) and Ravallion (2002). As in the previous
evidence, the Kuznets’ hypothesis ﬁnds no support and the eﬀectiveness of human capital
becomes weaker.
To make the results from dynamic and static panel regressions comparable, I replicate
the Fixed and Random Eﬀects estimates on the restricted sample and report the coeﬃ-
cients in Table 10. The linear term for stock market development still has a positive and
signiﬁcant eﬀect throughout all estimates, while the ˆ γ2 are non-signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero in all speciﬁcations.
As a robustness check, I re-estimate the equations in Tables 9-10 with government
expenditure and trade over GDP as additional regressors. Table 11 reports the estimated
coeﬃcients for stock market capitalization, both in linear and non-linear terms, and for
the new control variables. Both static and dynamic regressions support the prediction of
a positive γ1, while the negative γ2 is only signiﬁcant in the system-GMM for smpr.T h e
21Results with time-continent eﬀects are available upon request.
24estimates for government expenditure, which are non-signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero,
reﬂect the ambiguity of theoretical predictions and previous empirical evidence. The
coeﬃcients for trade openness from Fixed Eﬀects regressions point towards a positive eﬀect
on inequality, consistently with previous theoretical predictions and empirical evidence
(see, for example, Epifani and Gancia, 2002, Feenstra and Gordon, 2001, Robbins, 1996,
Spilimbergo et al., 1999). The dynamic panel data estimates support the opposite view,
even though to a lesser extent, since the negative coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at 8 per cent,
at most.
5.3.3 Summary
The estimates reported in this section suggest that stock market development tends to raise
income inequality. The declining part of the hump predicted by the model is supported in a
less robust way by the data. This evidence can be reconciled with the model, since the peak
of the Gini coeﬃcient may only occur at such high levels of stock market development that
are not observed in the sample. Dynamic Panel Data estimates suggest the relationship
between stock market development and income inequality to hold in the long run, as
predicted by the general equilibrium version of the model. Results from the cross-sectional
regressions conﬁrm the prediction that investor protection only aﬀects income inequality
through the development of the equity market.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper provides theoretical predictions and empirical support for a systematic relation-
ship between investor protection, ﬁnancial development and income inequality. I develop
an overlapping generation model with risk-averse agents, heterogeneous in their ability,
where production can take place with a safe or a risky technology. In the presence of ﬁ-
nancial frictions, arising from the non-observability of realizations and imperfect investor
protection, I study the occupational and ﬁnancial choices for diﬀerent ability groups. Bet-
ter investor protection promotes ﬁnancial development and aﬀects income inequality in a
number of ways. First, it improves risk sharing, thereby reducing income volatility for a
given size of the risky sector. Second, it raises the share of population exposed to earning
risk. Finally, since ability aﬀects risky payoﬀs, it increases the overall reward to ability.
The ﬁrst eﬀect tends to reduce inequality, while the other two boost it. The main result
of the paper is that income dispersion increases at ﬁrst with ﬁnancial development, and
then declines. In the empirical section, I provide evidence consistent with the predictions
of the model.
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The assumptions that A>B + r and ϕA < B+ r together with continuity of Vi in πi
imply the existence of a unique point π∗ ∈ (0,1) where V ∗ = B. From this, it follows that

























<v(B,r). To prove that
π∗ is a threshold, I just need to show that Vi is increasing in πi. The derivative of Vi w.








































To prove that the threshold ability is decreasing in investor protection, I obtain the











and show that it is negative. I have derived dV












dp > 0 for any π, since utility is concave. It follows that dπ∗
dp < 0.
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dp ≤ 0. Therefore, d2π∗
(dp)2 = −(> 0)
−1 {(≥ 0)+
30(> 0)− (≤ 0)}(≤ 0)− (> 0)
−1 {< 0} > 0.
Proposition 1
To prove the increasing monotonicity of stock market size, and its concavity at high

















From Lemma 1, dπ∗
dp ≤ 0,t h a ti m p l i e sdsm
dp ≥ 0; hence, the stock market size is increasing
in investor protection. From Lemma 2, d2π∗
(dp)2 > 0.M o r e o v e r ,lim
p→1
dπ∗













v(wh,r)−v(wl,r)+[πv0(wh,r)+(1−π)v0(wl,r)]pA =0 . It follows that sm is concave in p in a
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+ B − A[1 − G(π∗)][π∗ +( 1− π∗)ϕ]
o
.
Stock market as a ratio of GDP is increasing in investor protection,
d sm
Y
dp ≥ 0 for any
p ∈ [0,1],s i n c edπ∗
dp ≤ 0 and the term in brackets is always positive. To prove concavity
of sm
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Notice that the term in the ﬁrst two lines represents the market size eﬀect and is positive
for all p, while the last line accounts for the risk sharing eﬀect and is negative for all p.








g(1)(A − B − r)
2 > 0.
For p → 1, π∗ → π∗
p=1 =
(B−ϕA)+r
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A− r = B, dπ∗
dp → 0.I s t u d y h o w
dV ar(w)
dp approaches zero in a left
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32It follows that, in a neighborhood to the left of p =1 ,
dV ar(w)
dp





π (1 − π)g(π)dπ < 0.
Proposition 2
Recall from Proposition 1 that sm is increasing in p. I characterize the relationship
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p=1 =
(B−ϕA)+r
















A− r = B,a n ddπ∗











2 A2 (1 − p)
R 1



























since v00 < 0 for any CRRA utility function.
BC l o s e d e c o n o m y
B.1 The dynamics
























[π +( 1− π)ϕ]g(π)dπ
− [1 − G(π∗
t)]rt}.
As noticed in section 4, earnings depend on factor prices, which are functions of π∗
t and
capital employed in the ﬁnal sector, KYt= Kt− 1+ G(π∗
t). This implies that the threshold
ability π∗
t becomes an implicit function of Kt and the analytical characterization of the
dynamic equilibrium becomes awkward. Therefore, I proceed by means of numerical
solutions. The main results are displayed in Figures 4-5. In all simulations, I adopt the
following parametrization: A =1 2 0 , B =1 0 0 , α =0 .33, β =0 .17 (equivalent to a six per
cent annual discount for thirty years, i.e. a generation), and G uniform in [0, 1].
Figure 4 describes the dynamics of an economy that starts with a very low capital
endowment, K0, and an intermediate degree of investor protection, p =0 .5.W h e nK0 is
too low (K0 <α B / (1− α)(A −B)) ,t h ei n t e r e s tr a t ei ss oh i g hr e l a t i v et ot h ep r i c eo ft h e
intermediate good that no young agent chooses the risky technology. Hence, there is no
stock market and inequality is zero. As capital is accumulated, the interest rate falls and
the price of intermediates rises. When the ratio r/χ becomes low enough, some young
agents prefer the risky project and raise capital through equities. This requires a shift of
capital out of the ﬁnal good sector, which in turn tends to raise r and lower χ.A sar e s u l t ,
with capital accumulation and an expanding stock market, r/χ f a l l sb yl e s st h a ni tw o u l d
in the absence of the risky technology. Also, a positive stock market size implies that
some income inequality arises due to the “market size” eﬀect, as in the model of sections
2-3. Moreover, the ratio between factor prices, r/χ,a l s oa ﬀects inequality by changing
the earnings diﬀerentials between safe and risky entrepreneurs. The lower the ratio, the
wider the earnings diﬀerentials, the higher inequality (“relative factor prices” eﬀect). This
implies that, with endogenous prices, inequality may vary even if stock market size does
not. The adjustment of capital and prices continues until the steady state is reached.
Decreasing marginal productivity of capital guarantees the existence of the steady state.
Figure 5 shows the adjustment after a policy change that increases investor protection
from p =0to p =0 .05, starting from the steady state. Due to the convexity of π∗
t in
p, the risky intermediate sector expands remarkably in response to the policy change.
The marginal productivity of capital rises sharply both because some capital is shifted to
the risky sector and because the production of intermediates increases. This causes an
overshooting of the interest rate, that gradually declines with capital accumulation to its
new (higher) steady state level. Inequality immediately jumps up and oscillates around
its new (higher) steady state level until capital and prices are stable.
If the policy change occurs at high levels of investor protection, the eﬀect on produc-









Dynamics starting from K=0.5





























Figure 4: Dynamics from a low initial capital endowment (K=0.5) to the steady state,
given p=0.5.
tivity of factors (hence prices) is weaker. An increase in p induces a small shift of capital
from the ﬁnal to the risky intermediate sector, and has almost no eﬀect on the interest
rate. Inequality falls, since the “risk sharing” eﬀect outweighs the “market size” eﬀect at
high levels of investor protection.
B.2 The steady state
In the steady state, Kt+1 = Kt = K and π∗
t+1= π∗















πwh (π)+( 1− π)wl (π)
i
g(π)dπ =0 .
The risky intermediate sector is active, at least in the presence of perfect investor protec-






1−α. Comparative statics for p in the steady state
are depicted in Figure 6 showing that Lemmas 1-3 and Propositions 1-2 continue to hold
in the closed economy. In fact, the “relative factor prices” eﬀect, that aﬀects inequality
along the dynamics, is irrelevant in the steady state. Therefore, the comparative statics
on investor protection is driven by the “market size” and “risk sharing” eﬀects only, as in
















































































F i g u r e6 :C o m p a r a t i v es t a t i c sf o ri n v e s t o rp r o t e c t i o ni nt h es t e a d ys t a t e .
36This section describes the procedure I followed for simulating the small open economy
of sections 2-3 step by step.
1. Give values for the main parameters (A, B, ϕ, β, α) and the interest rate, and






2. Compute values for the parameters of the Lognormal distribution of abilities, (µ,σ),
from Barro and Lee’s (2000) data. The database provides observations for the per-
centages of the population aged 15 and above with no, primary, secondary and
tertiary education (lu, lp, ls, lh), along with the average year of each education level
(pyr, syr, hyr). I compute the average years of schooling for people with primary,




;q2 = q1 +
syr
ls+ lh












li (qi − E (Q))
2 ,
with l0 = lu, l1 = lp, l2 = ls and l3 = lh. Group the countries in low-income,
middle-income and high-income following the WDI criterion and take the average
values of E (Q) and V (Q). Finally, µ and σ can be derived from the expressions for






3. Deﬁne a grid of 101 degrees of investor protection p ∈ [0,1], and a grid of initial





, equally spaced by 0.0001 (the ﬁner
the grid, the better the approximation).
4. Draw Π =10001 ability levels from a Lognormal (µ,σ) and sort them in ascending or-
der. Identify the ability level π.9995: G(π.9995)=0 .9995 and divide every π ≤ π.9995
by this ﬁgure. Replace all π>π .9995 by 1, so that the distribution is normalized to
values included in [0,1], and truncated in a way that makes the top 0.05 per cent of
37the population successful with certainty. Compute the Cdf of ability,
G(πi)=
# of realizations π ≤ πi
Π
.
5. For every degree of investor protection p
(a) compute π∗ (p) as the solution to the technology choice problem. In particular,










wh = A[π∗p(1 − ϕ)+ϕ +( 1− p)(1− ϕ)] − r
wl = A[π∗p(1 − ϕ)+ϕ] − r>0.
(b) For every ability π




A[π∗p(1 − ϕ)+ϕ +( 1− p)(1− ϕ) ] − r
π<π ∗
π ≥ π∗
  ∼ Bi(N,π),w i t hN =#of π ≥ π∗.
ii. sort w and derive its cumulative density function as F (wi)=
# of realizations w≤wi
Π
iii. compute the Lorenz Curve as L(wm)=mean of w≤wm
mean of w
m
Π for m =1 ,2,...Π





(c) save the threshold and the Gini in (1 × p) vectors, π∗ (p) and Gini(p), the earn-
ings realizations, their distribution and the Lorenz curve in (p × Π) matrices,
w(p,π), F(p,w(p,π)) and L(p,w(p,π))
When simulating the closed economy, step 1 does not specify r.
Step 5.(a) ﬁnds the threshold ability π∗
t (p) which solves (10) for a given initial cap-







t [πi+( 1 −
πi) ϕ]g(πi)+G(π∗) B
o−α















t)]r and plugged into step 5.a. as new initial capital Kt. This recursion goes on until
the steady state is reached and Kt = Kt+1.
38Country CL CS PL PS Country CL CS PL PS
Australia y y y y Kenya y y
Austria y Korea y y y y
B a n g l a d e s h y yy M a l a y s i a yyyy
Barbados y Mauritius y y
B e l g i u m yyy M e x i c o yyyy
Bolivia y Nepal y
Botswana y Netherlands y y y y
Bulgaria y New Zealand y y y y
B r a z i l yyyy N o r w a y yyyy
C a n a d a yyyy P a k i s t a n yyyy
Chile y y y Panama y
China y y Paraguay y
Colombia y y y Peru y y y y
Costa Rica y y y Philippines y y y
Denmark y y y y Poland y y y
Ecuador y y y Portugal y y y
Egypt y y y Romania y
El Salvador y Russia y y
Finland y y y y Singapore y y y y
France y y y y Slovak Republic y
Germany y y y y South Africa y y
Ghana y y y Spain y y y y
Greece y y Sri Lanka y y y y
Guatemala y Sweden y y y y
Honduras y Switzerland y
Hong Kong y y y y Taiwan y y y y
Hungary y y Thailand y y y y
India y y y y Trinidad and Tobago y y y
Indonesia y y y y Tunisia y y
Iran y Turkey y y y
Ireland y United Kingdom y y y y
Israel y y United States y y y y
Italy y y y y Uruguay y y
Jamaica y y Venezuela y y y y
J a p a n yyyy Z a m b i a y
Jordan y y y y Zimbabwe y y
Countries and Samples
Table A
Note: C and P stand for cross-sectional and panel datasets, respectively. 
L and S for large and small samples.
39Table 2. Stock market development and income inequality
cross-section - 1980-2000





























































































R2 .550 554 .546 575 .519 .520 .521 .554 .543 .538
O b s 6 96 96 86 86 8 6 8 6 76 76 8 6 7
The dependent variable is the average Gini coeﬃcient between 1980 and 2000. GDP and education are the
initial values, stock market development is the average. All regressions include a dummy for Latin America.
Coeﬃcients are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares. Robust standard errors within parenthesis, 5%
and 10% signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in bold and italics, respectively.
Table 3. Stock market size, investor protection and income inequality
cross-section - 1980-2000















smcap ∗ investor_pr .012
(.064)
































R2 .512 .548 .565 .629 .637
O b s 4 34 34 34 2 4 2
The dependent variable is the average Gini coeﬃcient between 1980 and 2000. GDPand education
are the initial values, stock market development is the average. All regressions include a dummy for
Latin America. Coeﬃcients are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares. Robust standard errors
within parenthesis, 5% and 10% signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in bold and italics, respectively.
40Table 4. Stock market development and income inequality
IV - cross-section - 1980-2000









































R2 .429 -.228 .465 .505 .555 .509 .623 .639



























S arg an .203 .751 .249 .084 .305 .485 .278 .411
The dependent variable is the Gini coeﬃcient between 1980 and 2000, the regressors are initial GDP,
GDP2 and sec 25, and the period average stock market development. Coeﬃcients are 2SLS estimates, stock
market development instrumented with [uk, ge, fr legal origins] and [investor_pr, eﬀ_jud, (investor_pr)2,
(eff_jud)2] respectively in IV 1 and IV 2. Standard errors within parenthesis, 5% and 10% signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients in bold and italics, respectively. P-values are reported for the ﬁrst stage F-test and for the
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. Latin America dummy included in all equations.
41Table 5. Investor protection and stockmarket development
OLS - cross-section - 1980-2000
smcap smpr













































R2 .419 .661 .244 .436
O b s 6 94 36 8 4 2
The dependent variable is stock market development between 1980 and 2000. Coeﬃcient estimates from
the ﬁrst stage of columns 1, 5, 3, and 7 of Table 4. Standard errors within parenthesis, 5% and 10%
signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in bold and italics, respectively.
Table 6. Stock market development and income inequality Sensitivity analysis
12345678

























R2 .515 .516 .506 .533 .409 -.213 .401 .477















Sargan .261 .693 .413 .167
The dependent variable is the latest available observation of Gini coeﬃ cient after 1985. GDP and education are initial
values. Stock market development is 1980-2000 average. Cols 5-8 report 2SLS estimates with stock market development
instrumented by [uk, fr, ge legal origins]. Robust standard errors within parenthesis, 5% and 10% signiﬁcant coeﬃ cients in
bold and italics, respectively. P-values are reported for the ﬁrst stage F-test and for the Sargan test. Latin America dummy
included in all equations.
42Table 6b. Stock market development and income inequality Sensitivity analysis













R2 .609 .625 .632 .635
Obs. 44 44 40 40
The dependent variable is the average Gini over 1985-2000. GDP and education are
initial values. Stock market development is 1985 value Robust standard errors within
parenthesis, 5% and 10% signiﬁcant coeﬃ cients in bold and italics, respectively. Latin
America dummy included in all equations.
Table 7. Stock market development and income inequality
Robustness analysis - cross-section - 1980-2000

























































R2 .557 .564 .551 .584 .379 -.133 .452 .526















Sargan .286 .537 .271 .088
Dependent variable is the average Gini coeﬃ cient over 1980-2000. The other control variables are GDP, GDP2 and
sec25.C o e ﬃ cients in cols IV 1 are 2SLS estimates with stock market development instrumented by [uk, fr, ge legal
origins]. Robuststandard errors within parenthesis, 5% and 10% signiﬁcant coeﬃ cients respectively in bold and
italics. P-values are reported for the ﬁrst stage F and the Sargan tests
43Table 8. Stock market development and income inequality
static panel - 1976-2000



























































R2 .227 .236 .239 .241 .243 .236
Observations 157 157 157 157 144 144








The dependent variable is the Gini coeﬃcient. Sample of 52 (50) countries, non overlapping ﬁve-year
observations spanning 1976-2000. GDP and sec25 are initial values, smcap and smpr are average ones.
Standard errors in parenthesis, 5% and 10% signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in bold and italics, respectively. P-
values of the Hausman tests are reported below RE estimates. P-values of the F-test for time ﬁxed eﬀects
are reported in parenthesis.
44Table 9. Stock market development and income inequality
Dynamic Panel Data - 1976-2000

























































































Sargan .617 .645 .702 .974 551 .987 .739 .985
m2 .940 .908 .774 .622 .344 .868 .363 .770











Dependent variable is the log diﬀerence of Gini. Sample of 36 (32) countries, non-overlapping 5-year
observations spanning 1976-2000. Estimation was performed with Arellano-Bover two-step system-GMM
procedure. All regressors in diﬀerence are instrumented with their lagged levels, all levels with lagged
diﬀerences. Coeﬃcient estimates are from the ﬁrst step. Standard errors are reported within parenthesis,
5% and 10% signiﬁcant coeﬃcients are respectively in bold and italics. P-values for F-test, Sargan and m2
tests are from the second step.
45Table 10. Stock market development and income inequality
static panel - 36 countries - 1976-2000





































R2 .163 .159 .158 .139
Observations 125 125 112 112
Country FE Yes Yes Yes No
Hausman Test .029 .014 .015 .127
The dependent variable is the Gini coeﬃcient. Sample of 36 countries, non-overlapping ﬁve-year observa-
tions spanning 1976-2000. GDP and sec25 are initial values, smcap is the period average. Standard errors
are reported within parenthesis, 5% and 10% signiﬁcant coeﬃcients are in bold and italics, respectively.
P-values for the Hausman tests.
46Table 11. Stock market development and income inequality - Robustness analysis

























































R2 .224 .203 .260 .257
S arg an .996 .999 .993 .943
m2 .793 .842 .462 .454
Obs 125 125 112 112 84 84 84 84
Dependent variable is Gini in FE and RE columns, log diﬀerence of Gini in GMM. Samplesof non-
overlapping 5-year observations spanning 1976-2000. The regressors of equations in FE (GMM) are the
same as inTable 8 (9) plus (log diﬀerence of) government expenditure, trade and private credit as a ratio
of GDP. FE are ﬁxed and random eﬀects regressions, chosen on the basis of speciﬁcation tests, whose
statistics are available upon request. GMM are Arellano-Bover two-step system-GMM estimations, where
diﬀerences of all regressors are instrumented with lagged levels and levels with lagged diﬀerences. Coeﬃ-
cients are from the ﬁrst step, p-values for Sargan and m2 tests are from the second. Standard errors are
reported within parenthesis, 5% and 10% signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in bold and italics.
47